Mancur Olson

In his 1965 book "The Logic of Collective Action," Mancur Olson challenged the traditional assumption that groups of individuals with shared interests will naturally work together. He argued that, due to the "free-rider" problem, large groups are much less likely to organize and act collectively than small, focused groups. This theory fundamentally reshaped the study of public choice and political economy.

Olson further expanded his theories in his 1982 book "The Rise and Decline of Nations," arguing that stable societies accumulate special-interest groups over time. These organizations seek to redistribute wealth rather than create it, eventually stifling economic growth and innovation. He used this framework to explain the economic stagnation of post-war Great Britain.

Mancur Olson spent the most prominent part of his academic career as a professor of economics at the University of Maryland. Prior to that, he taught at major institutions like Princeton and Harvard. He was also heavily involved in establishing the Center for Institutional Reform and the Informal Sector (IRIS) at Maryland.

According to Olson, the free-rider problem occurs when individuals realize they can enjoy the benefits of a collective good without having to contribute to its costs. Because large groups cannot easily force participation or exclude non-contributors, collective action tends to fail unless there are "selective incentives." This means large groups must offer private rewards to get people to join their cause.