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Martin Hellwig - Economist
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Martin Hellwig

Economist German Contemporary Banking Capital Regulation Bank Capital

description Martin Hellwig Overview

Martin Hellwig is a German economist and a director at the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods in Bonn. He is a leading academic voice on financial regulation, known for co-authoring the 2013 book "The Bankers' New Clothes" with Anat Admati. The book argues that banks operate with dangerous levels of debt and advocates for much higher equity capital requirements to ensure financial stability. Hellwig's extensive research also explores the microeconomics of banking, systemic risk, and the macroeconomic implications of financial market imperfections.

insights Ranking position

Martin Hellwig ranks #185 of 253 in the Economist ranking, behind Lawrence Christiano, ahead of Branko Milanovic.

help Martin Hellwig FAQ

What is the main argument of The Bankers' New Clothes by Martin Hellwig and Anat Admati?

Published in 2013, the book argues that banks should hold substantially more equity and rely far less on debt financing. Hellwig and Admati systematically dismantle common industry arguments against higher capital requirements, contending that such reforms would reduce systemic risk without constraining lending.

Where does Martin Hellwig work?

Hellwig is a director at the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods in Bonn, Germany. Before joining the Max Planck Society, he was a professor of economics at the University of Mannheim.

Who co-authored The Bankers' New Clothes with Martin Hellwig?

The book was co-authored with Anat Admati, a professor of finance and economics at the Stanford Graduate School of Business. Together they drew an analogy to Hans Christian Andersen's tale of the emperor's new clothes, arguing that the banking industry's justifications for high leverage are transparently flawed.

What is Martin Hellwig's contribution to the study of systemic risk?

Hellwig has published extensively on how complex interconnections among financial institutions amplify crises, going beyond the analysis of individual bank risk. His work emphasizes that the incentive structures within banks encourage excessive risk-taking that regulators must address through structural reform rather than incremental adjustments.

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