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G. E. Moore

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description G. E. Moore Overview

G.E. Moore (1873-1958) was a prominent British philosopher known for his defense of intuitive ethical thought. His Principia Ethica argued against attempts to derive moral principles from scientific observation, instead championing the immediate and obvious nature of moral judgments. He is particularly relevant to those interested in ethics, epistemology, and the foundations of philosophical reasoning, especially those exploring traditional approaches to morality.

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What is the naturalistic fallacy as described by G. E. Moore?

In Principia Ethica (1903), Moore defined the naturalistic fallacy as the error of identifying the property 'good' with any natural or psychological property such as pleasure, happiness, or desire. He argued that 'good' is a simple, indefinable quality grasped through intuition, much like the color yellow.

What is G. E. Moore's contribution to common-sense philosophy?

In his 1925 essay 'A Defence of Common Sense,' Moore argued that ordinary propositions such as 'I have a body' and 'the earth existed before I was born' are known with certainty. This position challenged skepticism and idealism and influenced later thinkers including Ludwig Wittgenstein.

Where did G. E. Moore teach philosophy?

Moore was a professor of philosophy at Cambridge University from 1925 to 1939 and served as editor of the journal Mind, the leading British philosophy journal. He was a central figure in the Cambridge intellectual community and was closely associated with Bertrand Russell.

How did Principia Ethica influence the Bloomsbury Group?

Principia Ethica was enormously influential among the Bloomsbury Group, a circle of British intellectuals that included Virginia Woolf, John Maynard Keynes, and Clive Bell. Its argument that 'good' is undefinable and apprehended intuitively shaped the group's aesthetic and ethical thinking in the early decades of the 20th century.